The Editors at World Political Review discuss challenges ahead.
Laurentino Cortizo, a veteran politician and former agriculture minister, narrowly won Panama’s presidential election earlier this month. Cortizo had focused his campaign on cleaning up the Central American nation’s image after a series of high-profile corruption scandals. But given the entrenched patronage networks and weak institutions of accountability in Panama, he will have a hard time following through on that promise, says Orlando J. Pérez, an expert on Latin American politics at Millersville University in Pennsylvania. In an email interview with WPR, he discusses the election results and what to expect from the new administration.
World Politics Review: How did Cortizo prevail in the presidential election, and how will his slim margin of victory affect his ability to get things done as president?
Orlando J. Pérez: Cortizo was able to mobilize base voters from his Democratic Revolutionary Party, or PRD, which normally comprises about a third of the electorate. In a fragmented field of candidates, a plurality of 33 percent was enough to win, as Panama’s electoral system does not allow for a runoff vote.
The surprise of the election was the strong second-place showing by Romulo Roux from Democratic Change, the party founded by Ricardo Martinelli, who served as Panama’s president from 2009 until 2014. Roux was essentially a proxy for Martinelli, who is currently in jail awaiting trial on wiretapping charges, and also faces corruption-related allegations. Martinelli had planned to run for mayor of Panama City and a seat in the National Assembly, but one week before the elections, the Electoral Tribunal prohibited him from appearing on the ballot for either position. The ruling was controversial, as earlier indications were that he could run. Still, Roux’s performance, garnering 31 percent of the vote, indicates that Martinelli remains a viable political force despite his legal troubles.
Independent candidate Ricardo Lombana came in third with 19 percent, more votes than any independent since democracy was restored in Panama in 1990. His strong result represents a growing challenge to the traditional parties, but ultimately, the election showed the continuing strength of the major parties’ patronage networks. Additionally, an anti-incumbent social media movement, #NoAlaReleccion, Spanish for “no to reelection,” managed to mobilize enough votes to defeat more than 30 sitting legislators, mostly from Democratic Change and outgoing President Juan Carlos Varela’s Panamenista Party.
Cortizo’s margin of victory was smaller than expected, but the PRD gained seats in the National Assembly. With its ally, the National Liberal Republican Movement, it will control 38 out of 71 seats. Partisan allegiance can be fluid in Panama, however, so Cortizo will still need to work with other parties to gain approval for his agenda.
WPR: What issues will Cortizo focus most heavily on as president? Will he actually tackle corruption, which was one of his campaign promises?
Pérez: Of the main issues Cortizo focused on during his campaign—including promises to increase investment in education, infrastructure and public services—tackling corruption will be the most difficult. Panama’s political system has many entrenched interests that exert influence through patronage and extra-legal payments, and institutions of accountability are generally weak.
The first major challenge will be handling the Martinelli case. Cortizo will be under pressure from Panamanian civil society and the United States to allow the legal process to proceed, but there will be countervailing interests pushing for a quick resolution. In particular, Democratic Change is likely to push hard for Martinelli’s release, and that could be the price the party demands for cooperating with the Cortizo administration. In the end, it is unlikely that Cortizo will significantly change the underlying structures that facilitate and encourage corrupt practices in Panama.
WPR: How might the new Cortizo administration balance relations between China and the United States, given concerns in Panama over falling too deeply into debt with China?
Pérez: I do not expect very major changes in Panama’s foreign policy under Cortizo. Panama’s foreign policy is tied to the efficient and neutral operation of the Panama Canal and to the continued incentivizing of foreign direct investment. China is a major user of the Panama Canal and could potentially invest considerable amounts of money in Panamanian infrastructure projects. Panama and China are negotiating a free trade agreement, and China has discussed building a rail system connecting Panama City with Chiriqui province in western Panama. The project would be carried out under China’s Belt and Road Initiative at a cost of approximately $4 billion. The prospect of such large-scale investment was a primary factor in President Varela’s decision to switch Panama’s diplomatic recognition to China after decades of relations with Taiwan, and Cortizo will not reverse that decision.
He will have to tread lightly when it comes to China, however, since the United States is still the major foreign player on the isthmus. Chinese plans to build a new embassy near the entrance to the Panama Canal were recently derailed when the U.S. pressured the Varela administration to withdraw permission to use the land. Relations with the U.S. are critical for Panama, and no leader would deliberately harm them. But China is and will continue to be a major player, and Panama will need to balance the two powers as it seeks to maintain the viability of the Panama Canal and the kind of foreign investment that has sustained the fastest-growing economy in the Western Hemisphere for the past 15 years.